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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
- The Utah Court of Appeals has iiirisdlction to hear this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. !; "" 8 J a -u." In

,1'^b)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
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Is the evidence asceri-r.:,-;.. .

-

-
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of common law, pursuant
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error" when reviewed
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the Findings
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and ,'or:.: - asions of Law,

made for a transcript.
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(R.3 31-4-
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:'he Cour: ^

been challenged; and no request has been
Therefore, the Court's Finding'

of Fact

cannot be overturned.

CONSTITUTIONAL P R O V i s i O N S AND S T A T I J T E s
DETERMINATIVE ON APPEAL
The statute determinative on appeal n
forth in full i i 1 Appellant's Addendum.

\
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Appellee accepts the statement of the case set forth byAppellant, as far as it goes. Appellant has set forth facts as the
Trial Court found them. The Trial Court, however, made substantial
additional findings of fact which have not been challenged byAppellant.

The record on appeal includes no transcript; and the

only record of facts which are made part of the record are the
Findings

of

Fact made by

the Court below.

Those

findings

substantiate the ruling of the Court, on any standard of proof.
Appellant, in his statement of facts, set forth certain facts found
by the Court below as part of its Findings of Fact. Appellant did
not, however, set forth all of the Findings of Fact by the Court
below, which facts are not in dispute.

Appellee therefore sets

forth additional facts as found by the Court below.
Additional Statement of Facts
1.

During the periods of cohabitation the parties spent time

with several family friends, including going on trips, like one
particular Lake Powell trip. During all of those trips the parties
did not refer to each other as husband or wife.
2.

The friends who knew the parties best believed that the

parties were living together as a couple but not as husband and
wife.
2

3.

During the period of cohabitation Laura had an intimate

relationship with one of these friends, contradicting any notion
that she was married to Mike, although he was living in the marital
home.
4.

On several occasions during the period of cohabitation

Mike told Laura that he wanted to be married to her and asked her
to remarry him. On each of those occasions Laura declined to enter
into a new marriage with Mike.
5.

The parties filed separate tax returns for 1994 and 1995.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The legal error complained of by Appellant is of little or no
relevance to the decision of the Trial Court.

That decision is

supported by substantial Findings of Fact, which are not being
contested.

No change in the standard of proof required would

change the Court's ruling.
Nevertheless, Appellee believes that the Trial Court used the
correct standard of proof in its decision making process.
The time provision of the statute on proving a common law
marriage

at

issue; and

it

is not

necessary

to

attack

the

constitutionality of the law to craft a remedy, should one be
needed.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER ANY STANDARD OF PROOF, THE COURT'S RULING THAT THERE IS NO
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE MUST BE SUSTAINED.
The Court below first reviewed the standard of proof which it
decided was appropriate to determine the existence of a marriage
under the controlling statute.
in Point II of this brief.

Appellee will discuss the standard
Because Appellee believes the real

issue is whether Plaintiff proved the necessary facts for the
existence under any standard, that issue is discussed first.
The Court set out 5 distinct factors which must be proved to
meet the requirements of § 3 0-1-4.5.

Those factors were that the

marriage must arise out of a contract

between

two

consenting

a

solemnized

parties who:
1)

are capable of giving consent;

2)

are

legally

capable

of

entering

into

marriage under the provision of this chapter;
3)

have cohabited;

4)

mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations;

5)

hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and

and,

general reputation as husband and wife. (R. 235-6).
The Court found that the first four of the five enumerated
factors existed, by clear and convincing evidence.
4

The Court

therefore

concentrated

its

analysis

on

factor

five

and

the

underlying and fundamental question of "whether they consented to
a common law contract" (R. 235) . Appellant does not challenge the
points on which the Court based its decision; nor does Appellant
contest the Court's Findings of Fact.

Those facts must therefore

be deemed to be conclusively be deemed to be true. Since Appellant
only challenges the standard of proof to which he was held, the
Court's decision must be upheld if that same conclusion would have
been reached using the standard of proof demanded by Appellant. It
is established law that a legal error made by the court below which
is deemed by this Court to have played no part in the decision will
be insufficient to overturn the decision, if the decision is
otherwise correct. This principle was set out by the Utah Supreme
Court in Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342
(Utah 1993) when the Court held:
However, to reverse a trial verdict, this court must find not
a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error
affected the result. 862 P.2d at 1347.
The failure of Appellant to challenge the Court's decisional
basis or the facts on which it is based forces Appellant to attack
the decision on very narrow grounds. Those grounds are simply not
sufficient to overturn the Court's ruling, and therefore, the
ruling must be affirmed.

5

The Trial Court found that Plaintiff did not carry his burden
required by statute that the parties "acquire a uniform and general
reputation as husband and wife".

In reviewing the statement of

witnesses on the point, the Court said:
These witnesses testify that they viewed the parties as
a couple but never viewed the couple as married. In
other words, in the home where the parties were residing
they were not viewed by their most intimate friends as a
married couple.
Yet these were the friends of the
parties, the ones who knew them best. If they did not
view Mike and Laura as husband and wife, one well may
wonder who did view them as husband and wife (R. 234).
The Court

then reviewed

the issue of

consent.

As to

Defendant, the Court stated:
Not only does Mike fail to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the parties acquired a uniform and general
reputation as husband and wife, he has failed to establish
that each party consented to a common law marriage
relationship.
In this case there is no single, clear fact demonstrating that
Laura consented to a common law marital contract. In fact the
evidence is to the contrary. On several occasions Mike asked
Laura to marry him. Each time she refused. That she rejected
his several proposals is evidence that she had not consented
to a marital relationship.
While consent must be established, as noted by the Supreme
Court in Whvte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 791, n. 3 (Utah 1994),
mutual consent can be shown by acquiescence. The facts
establish that for her own financial benefit Laura
affirmatively held herself out to the insurance company as
Mike's wife. To void embarrassment she held herself out to
the church representatives as Mike's wife. For a time she
wore a ring on her marriage finger. For several months she
allowed Mike to live in the home, enjoying a conjugal
relationship and sharing family expenses.
All of these
demonstrate some measure of acquiescence by her in the
existence of a marital relationship. On the other hand that
6

acquiescence is overcome by her own continued insistence that
the parties not remarry. She knowingly chose not to accept
Mike's marriage proposals. That evidence, which is clear and
convincing, off-sets any alleged acquiescence in a marital
relationship.
Laura knew Mike wanted to remarry and
repeatedly declined. Rather than evidencing consent, this
evidence is just the opposite, an insistent lack of consent,
(emphasis added) . (R. 233) .
The findings of the

trial court, especially as to consent,

deny the existence of a marriage, even under the lower standard of
preponderance of the evidence.

Reviewing the factual findings as

the Court has done, one cannot suggest that a review on any other
standard would bring a different result.
reviewed

The Trial Court has

this matter carefully and completely; and there is

insufficient evidence on which to base a reversal.

POINT II
THE COURT BELOW USED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF PROOF IN REVIEWING THE
EXISTENCE OF A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE.
This is an action in which Plaintiff sought to establish a
common law marriage.

The parties had previously been married and

divorced; but the parties continued to live together for periods of
time thereafter.

The attempt to establish a common law marriage

was made in order to improve the settlement to Defendant as a
result of the original decree.

The Court first found that the

establishment of a marriage in this manner should be by clear and
convincing evidence; and the Court then found that the elements of
7

the common law marriage had not been so established.

The Court

filed a detailed written decision relying on substantial case law
from other states.
State

of

Utah

and

The Court also reviewed public policy of the
found

the

higher

standard

of

proof

was

appropriate. In doing so, the Court again cited Whyte v. Blair, in
which the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Care must be given to guard against fraudulent marriage
claims, especially where a declaration of marriage would
reap financial rewards for an alleged spouse. (885 P.2d
at 795.
The Trial Court used due care and found that the standard of
proof had not been met.

In support of that finding, the Court

referred to fourteen other states which have used the clear and
convincing standard of proof in cases to determine the existence of
a common law marriage; and found only nine states which use the
preponderance of evidence standard (R. 240-241). Appellant argues
that the Trial Court was wrong in its counting of cases.

Using a

different methodology, Appellant argues that there are only fifteen
states which currently recognize common law marriage, and that only
five of those use the clear and convincing standard (Appellant's
brief, p. 10-11) .

The numbers of states which fall into each

category is open to interpretation and even manipulation.

In

finding fault with the Lower Court's count, however, Appellant
seems to be ignoring the obvious.

Many states have abolished

common law marriage, apparently believing that the abuses of such
8

a doctrine outweigh any advantages.

One might suggest that this

puts a solid majority of other states in a third category; one in
which NO evidence is sufficient to prove a common law marriage.
This position supports the conclusion of the Trial Court that
common law marriages should be declared only in cases where the
evidence is clear and convincing; and that extra care is needed to
avoid abuse.
Many of the decisions cited by both the Lower Court and
Appellant are somewhat vague, in that public policy arguments are
not fully discussed.
cites

One case of interest is one that Appellant •

for his contention.

In that

case, Metropolitan Life

Insurance Company v. Johnson, 645 P.2d 356 (Idaho 1983), the Idaho
Court admits that it is in the minority in using the preponderance
standard:
We note that Idaho is among the dwindling minority of states
which continue to recognize common law marriage. In 1952,
twenty American jurisdictions could be listed as recognizing
common law marriage. By 1960, the number was sixteen, and by
1974 the number had diminished fourteen.
The trend toward abolition of common law marriage indicates an
obvious hostility to the doctrine. That hostility is not
confined to those states which do not recognize common law
marriages. The courts of many jurisdictions recognizing the
doctrine also view it with disfavor.
Thus, to discourage common law marriage claims, many .
jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine impose stringent
evidentiary burdens on the party seeking to establish a common
law marriage. (Internal citations omitted) 645 P.2d at 3 59360.
9

While Idaho law applies the preponderance standard, it also
emphasizes the element of consent.

In this case, the Trial Court

specifically found a lack of consent; and that finding has not been
challenged in this appeal. This Court should be very cautious in
overruling the Lower Court and finding a marriage here.

Clearly

the parties were married at one time; and they have had a very
stormy relationship since that time.

It would be to Appellant's

advantage materially to prove that a marriage continued after the
divorce became final, as Appellant contends that the divorce
settlement was not fair (R. 244). This is not the time or manner
to contest such things, however.

He had his opportunity to do so

in the context of the divorce action, and chose not to do so. That
decision is now binding on him.

There is some evidence that

Appellant wants to prove the existence of a continuing marriage
simply to spite Appellee, as the Trial Court found a pattern of
abusive behavior on the part of both parties; and noted that mutual
protective orders have been entered to keep the parties apart (R.
243-4) .

Failing to guard the public interests which the Lower

Court cited in determining its burden of proof would indeed result
in an injustice in this instance.

10

POINT III
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE HAS NO MERIT; NOR IS IT
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES AT HAND.
Plaintiff also questions the legality of § 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. as
being in conflict with certain portions of the Utah Constitution.
Plaintiff argues that the portion of the law which requires proof
within

one year

of

the

termination

of

the

relationship

is

unconstitutional as it would not allow Defendant to establish the
relationship he seeks even on a successful appeal, as that appeal
would be too late.

Defendant suggests that this Court is able to

craft a remedy as it sees fit. Declaring the statute invalid would
not give Plaintiff any remedy.

The Court has ruled, based on the

facts, that Plaintiff has not proved the existence of a marital
relationship. The interpretation of the time provisions is not at
issue. Plaintiff has quoted Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P. 2d 918 (Utah
App. 1995) in support of his contention that the time provisions
"might present a constitutional question in a different context".
The Court chose not to review that question at the time, as it was
not relevant to its decision. A constitutional ruling is also not
relevant here to the decision of the Court. The legislature chose
to

recognize

common

law marriages

under

very

strict rules.

Defendant contends that the legislature has the power to set the
rules for such a recognition, which has long been denied Utah
residents under any circumstances.
11

The fact that the legislature

set such strict recognition rules supports the Lower Court's ruling
that a higher standard of proof must be used. This is not the type
of situation that this court referred to in suggesting that a
review of the constitutionality of the law might be appropriate
under "different circumstances".

Plaintiff has made his showing;

and he did so within one year, as set forth in the statute.
Because the underlying facts are not in dispute, no further showing
after the one year period is necessary.

This Court certainly has

the power to determine that a legal error was made and to reverse
the Lower Court and declare, on the basis of the facts proved, that
such a marriage existed.

There is no need for a remand or for a

further hearing below, if the Trial Court made such a legal error.
The act of this court in correcting the legal error would have the
effect of declaring the marriage valid as of the time of trial. No
constitutional attack on the law is necessary.

Appellee, of

course, has set forth what she believes to be a very strong case
against taking any action. Nevertheless, for the sake of argument,
this Court has many options to correct errors without declaring the
underlying statute unconstitutional.

CONCLUSION
The Trial Court reviewed the issues concerning the existence
of a common law marriage between the parties hereto according to
12
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ADDENDUM

I

W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170)
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS, L.L.C.
Attorney for Defendant
853 West Center Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone:
(801) 224-2119
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ^OURT OF UTAH COUNTY
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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witl i her attorney, W
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Guardian Ad L11 e111

C1 osing arguments wei e nt.;. u ^ -.-.paLaLC 1
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argument

• n

The Court, having heard the evidence and che

of counsel, c:r.ci beir -

-dvised in the premises,

enters its Findings o: - a. .. .-;:.•.,

J of I .aw:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

r 11

~ -~ r;.-trcies previ " •"

approximately nine years.

were married

"~-

'\ r*°riod

cf

T^^o.* divorce was ti:iu^
1

0?

2.

In October 1994 Mike moved back into the former marital

home with Laura and resided there with her and the children of the
parties until at least May 1995.
3.

From May 1995 through September 22, 1995 Mike did not

live at Laura's home nor cohabit with her.
4.

Judge Hansen previously made a finding in a protective

order action between these parties that Mike lived in Laura's home
at her request from September 22, 1995, through December 27, 1995.
5.

During the periods of cohabitation Mike routinely turned

over his paycheck to Laura and then received back some cash as
"walking around money."
6.

During the periods of cohabitation Laura worked and she

pooled her money with the money she received from Mike.
7.

Laura used the money she and Mike earned to pay the

significant credit card debt which Mike had incurred during the
period of separation preceding their divorce, to pay the home
mortgage, to pay family living expenses and obligations and to pay
her debts.
8.

During the period of cohabitation the parties acted much

like a family.
9.

When the parties' son was of age to be baptized the

parties met with the local L.D.S. Bishop to arrange for the son's

2
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1 JIL

:... p r o c e s s neither part) dispelled

the appearance

that: they were a family.
lA
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l

* --^n *-v,0 membership clerk
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T h e appearance w a s that
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lived

h e a n d Laura w e r e

he
back

t.oyei i/-;
II.

During the periods of cohabitation the parties spent time

wi t h severa 1 f air1.i 1 v f r iends , i nc 1 udi m
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. .».

..
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~ r ips , like ^ne
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2?.

T h e friends v:h?. knew the parties best believed that ""he
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wife.

together as a c^-^-t o u t not as husband and

• •

:°

r......^,-. *-1- - - or|od -pf cohabitation Laura had an intimate

relationship

. . .

. .: lends,

COL;....,;,

itlng any notion

that she was married to Mike, although he was living in the marital
home.

the

14.

Laura used Mike's mec^a.. c_... aental Insurance to cover

cost

of

some

of

her medical

treatments.

coveraae w " rlaimed bjr h e r as Mi k e # s wi fe.

This

insurance

T h e coveraae w a s o~ly

ava,..a;;^u L ^ ner as a wife ai id she ci aimed t h e benet 11 oi t.< 1a t
coverage.
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During the time the parties cohabited Laura held herself

out as Mike's wife to the insurance carrier.
16.

During the time the parties cohabited each was capable of

giving consent to a marriage and each was legally capable of
entering into a solemnized marriage.
17.

During the time the parties cohabited they each assumed

marital rights, duties and obligations.
18.

During the period of cohabitation Laura frequently wore

a ring on the finger of her left hand traditionally viewed as her
marriage finger.
19.

During the period of cohabitation Laura admitted to Mike

that she felt he had received an inequitable distribution in the
divorce.

She agreed with him that if the parties subsequently

separated that each would be entitled to one-half of the equity in
the home.
20.

On several occasions during their period of cohabitation

Mike told Laura that he wanted to be married to her and asked her
to remarry him. On each of those occasions Laura declined to enter
into a new marriage with Mike.
21.

The parties filed separate tax returns for 1994 and 1995.

22.

The complaint in this case was file on October 12, 1995,

during the course of the cohabitation and alleged common law
marriage of those parties.
4
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orders of the Court.
O A
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violated the protective order
i
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occasion she arranged visitation

When he ca^-
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J I-1 J Q ]

• oetween the parties and specifical] y restraining

any harassing or threatening behavior.

25.
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us

Then r:.e officer found out

* "

<3
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. trouble witu tiic courts

for violating protective orders.
26.

Laura

"il ;

-

times when she kuew LI^I

T

.

• •

~- • '

protective orders have ^ee,. dismissea b/

the Court. ••'.
2 7 .

:•

• •-.
•

i • •' .

-

*

• - . > . .

detailed, written ^rder setting forth t:ie visitat±un schedule
example, she denied Mike his UEA visitation with Zeb.
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t*ur

28.

At least some of Laura's denials of visitation to Mike

have been made in response to rulings by the Court that went
against Mxke.
29.

w

/

Almost all of the actions of Mike and Laura in each

violating the orders of the court, in harassing each other, in
involving the police and in fighting and spitting at each other,
have been witnessed by the children.

That alone is grounds for a

stern response by the Court as the children have been significantly
impact by the continual fighting of the parents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court determines that the appropriate standard to

prove the existence of a common law marriage is by clear and
convincing evidence.
2.

Both parties are and were capable of giving consent, they

were and are capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the
provision of law, they co-habitated, and they mutually assumed
marital rights, duties and obligations.

The parties did not,

however, acquire a uniform reputation as husband and wife.
3.

There is no proof to the legal standard required that

Laura consented to the existence of a marital relationship after
the previous divorce.

6
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4."

Plaintiff's complaint for the determination of a common

law marriage should be dismissed, having failed to have proof by
clear and convincing evidence ^f

; ::ecessarv prerequisites.

5# ^ The Court finds that: r,ut:, paicies i^ve acted i n contempt
of court by failing to obey previous orders of the Court.
'6.

The

Court

intends

to

impose

sanctd ons

as

seem

appropriate,, that wi 11 reserve such sanctions untix further hearing
now set for December 23, 1996,

_

^ • ;fj

an ember1,-^9 9 6 .' ;:- : 91V

DA'

BY THE COURT:*

rf^k'*

. , .J'^JS^A

SchQf>el4/:..Jngg4|) /

Anthony w.

,^

:OU^

pW

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the

2T^
«6 /

c

day of December, 1996
r ~ - ^..

.

mailed
1

Conclusions or Law, postage prepaid, to Brent Young, attorney .or
Plaintiff,
!

<

:

-

:

.

•

I vie

and Younq, :-*

Box 672, Prove, Utah 84603 and
.

_

•

.

•

-

.

-

.

!

84601.
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W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170)
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS, L.L.C.
Attorney for Defendant
853 West Center Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 224-2119
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo--MICHAEL LOY HANSEN,

:

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff,
vs .
C i v i l No.

LAURA T. HANSEN,

<23u£lIL1225>

Defendant.
oooOooo
Pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
heretofore entered in the above entitled action,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The appropriate standard to determine the existence of a

common-law marriage is by clear and convincing evidence.
2.

The Court has failed to find by clear and convincing

evidence the existence of a uniform reputation of the parties as
husband and wife or that Laura consented to the existence of a
marital relationship after the previous divorce.
3.

Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, no cause of action.

4.

The Court has found that both parties have acted in
1

0311

and the Court reserves sanctions :u: :arther hearing.
DATED this

Y

day of

FtJVW&*W

, I997^*l^y35&..**

BY THE COURT:

^M^j^%>

''i^'S#^^\+

VIM^WA^

JUDGE ANTHONY W. SCHOMEli^^S^^ ,.v,f >r

c—i

FICA::

I certify that on the 30'^

da

Y

GI

December, 1996

T

mailed a

true air: correct copy of r h- foregoing Judgment of Dismissal,
postage
Young, :-

•* ' • •
B ^ t •-

Provo, Utah 84603, and Keily Frye, -..

Center Street, suite 205, Provo, Utah 84601.

^J/^^diu

4-t^^hz

2

nsio

^/HAl ~0 til J- L I

T

W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (2170)
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS, L.L.C.
Attorney for Defendant
853 West Center Street
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 224-2119

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OOOOOOO
MICHAEL LOY HANSEN,
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

:

LAURA T. HANSEN,

:

Defendant.

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO AMEND

Civil No.

954402169

:
oooOooo

This matter came before Hon. Anthony W. Schofield, Judge of
the above-entitled Court, pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
Judgment.

The Court, having considered the memoranda of counsel,

and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the
following ORDER:
1.

The Motion to Amend is denied.

2.

The Court

concludes, as it previously did, that

the

correct burden of proof to establish a common law marriage is proof
by clear and convincing evidence.
3.

Plaintiff has raised a constitutional argument as to

whether he would have an adequate remedy if the Court's decision
1

0345

were reversed on appeal. The constitutional argument is premature
as there is no assurance that on appeal the appellate courts will
reverse the trial court judgment.

If they do and do not address

the constitutional argument in their reversal, then the issue of
the constitutional argument will be ripe for consideration upon
remand.
DATED this

5^ d
ay ofofZ$z4rk,
£gU 19 a*^2-t£rJ?
1 9 ^ 4 ^, ,
day
"

BY THE (XH^&'-x^^

"~^ SSE-

SX'

CERTIFICATE OF SERV]
I hereby certify that on the

/SP^" day of April, 1997, I did

mail a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Order
Denying Motion to Amend, postage prepaid to, Brent Young, attorney
for Plaintiff, Ivie & Young, P.O. Box 657, Provo, Utah 84603 and
Kelly Frye, Guardian Ad Litem, 32 West Center Street, Suite 205,
Provo, Utah 84 6 01.
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